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The Shochu Conundrum: 
Economics and GATT Article III 
Alex Davis 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper will discuss the National Treatment (NT) obligation contained in 
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 as 
applied in precedential tax discrimination cases. Case law has not taken a firm 
stance on the economic versus legal interpretation of the likeness/directly 
competitive or substitutable (DCS) criterion or the principle of “so as to afford 
protection” (SATAP) captured in Article III.2. After examining the case law on 
discriminatory taxation, I conclude that the NT obligation in trade agreements 
is imperfect. Nonetheless, NT is a critical component of these agreements, and 
the international trade order would collapse under the weight of protectionism 
were it not imposed. In order to ensure the efficacy of NT, the determination of 
likeness/DCS and protective application must consider market forces in 
addition to legal precedent. Economic indicators including elasticity of 
substitution and cross-price elasticity of the products in question are suitable 
measures of substitutability and are therefore the most accurate method of 
quantifying Article III violations. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947 with 
the intent to reduce or eliminate discriminatory and economically devastating 
tariffs imposed by the contracting parties (now Members under the WTO). 
Signatories to the GATT agreed to exercise reciprocity with respect to their 
international trade regimes by according “Most Favored Nation” status to one 
another.1 In this regard the agreement unambiguously increased global welfare 
by virtually eliminating protectionist trade barriers that were universally erected 
during the Smoot-Hawley era of global economic isolationism. Integral to the 
mission of the GATT is the National Treatment (NT) obligation captured in 
                                               
1 By granting MFN status to one another, contracting parties prevent discriminatory 
treatment by ensuring that importing countries may not discriminate in favor of goods 
from one contracting party over another. In other words, trade concessions granted to 
one country must be extended to all others with MFN status. 
1
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Article III, which in principle prohibits the contracting parties from creating 
internal policy that results in imported products being treated less favorably than 
“like” domestic products.2 In particular, Article III.1-2,4 reads as follows: 
 
1.     The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, 
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative 
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts 
or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production. 
 
2.     The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal 
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise 
apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a 
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. 
 
4.     The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the 
product. 
 
Attached to Article III.2, second sentence is an Interpretive Note regarding 
violations in the absence of like products: 
 
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be 
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases 
where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on 
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not 
similarly taxed. 
 
The reach of Article III is extensive; the provisions apply to virtually all taxes, 
laws, regulations or similar domestic policy instruments that affect the sale 
and/or distribution of imported goods after they have cleared customs and 
                                               
2 NT provisions may also be found in virtually every trade agreement, including the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights and the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
2
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entered domestic commerce.3 In addition to explicitly discriminatory internal 
measures, the NT provision also includes internal actions that may have an 
indirect effect on imported goods.4 Because the breadth of the NT obligation 
“may (depending on its interpretation) have a profound impact on countries’ 
freedom to choose domestic policies,” there have been numerous GATT disputes 
invoking Article III to address alleged discriminatory taxation.5  
 
Many precedential disputes involving alleged tax discrimination concern 
alcoholic beverages. The degree to which these beverages are horizontally 
differentiated by the application of appellations draws explicit country of origin 
distinctions between products that would otherwise be nearly identical, creating a 
regulatory environment ripe for Article III violations.6 In particular, this paper 
will focus on Brazilian Internal Taxation, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, Korea—
Alcoholic Beverages, and Chile—Alcoholic Beverages. In each case, the relevant 
party was alleged to have imposed taxes on imported spirits in excess of 
domestically produced alternatives. In each case, the adjudicating body found 
that all pairs of products concerned were directly competitive or substitutable 
(DCS); in the case of Japan, vodka and the domestically produced shochu were 
found to be like products. In addition to the cases concerning alcoholic beverages, 
I will discuss EC—Asbestos, the pivotal case affecting the integration of economic 
theory into decisions of the adjudicating bodies. 
 
Despite the similar outcomes of each case, the Panel and subsequent 
Appellate Body decision offered no clear methodology for interpreting the NT 
obligation. Eric Tsai concludes that post-Japan:  
 
[T]here currently exists a national treatment obligation that is certainly unclear, 
likely too harsh, and which ultimately will do violence to the General Agreement’s 
                                               
3 Hudec, Robert E. “GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an 
‘Aim and Effects’ Test.” The International Lawyer (1998), Vol. 32 No. 3, 619 - 649.  
4 These actions include regulatory measures that make no explicit distinction between 
foreign and imported products (called “origin neutral”), but which have a 
disproportionate impact on foreign goods or services that is for some reason viewed as 
wrong or illegitimate. See Hudec, 1998. 
5 Horn, Henrik and Mavroidis, Petros C. “Still Hazy after All These Years: The 
Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax 
Discrimination.” European Journal of International Law (2004), Vol. 15 No. 1, 39 – 69. 
6 For example, there is an explicit distinction made between French Cognac, Californian 
Brandy and Chilean Pisco despite the relative similarity of their production processes and 
end-uses. 
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integrity and make the WTO unnecessarily intrusive on national government policy 
making.7 
 
It is clear, however that case law and economic theory point in the same direction 
regarding the purpose of the provision.8 Because there is no context-independent 
definition of what constitutes like or DCS products, there is a need for greater 
reliance on an economic interpretation of the terms of Article III.9 Given the 
reality of imperfect substitutability and heterogeneity of products, the elasticity of 
substitution and cross-price elasticity present the best economic methods for 
determining the relative “likeness” of products on a case-by-case basis. 
 
2 Existing Literature on Economics of National Treatment 
 
Robert E. Hudec is an indispensable voice in any discussion of international 
trade law, and several of his works provided the inspiration for this analysis. His 
account of Brazilian Internal Taxes and pervasive discussion of the NT 
obligation in The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy is among the 
most insightful in the field. Its sequel, Enforcing International Trade Law: The 
Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System informed much of my argument 
and was rightly described by Andreas Lowenfeld as, “an erudite, elegant and 
sophisticated guide to the methods used by major trading nations to deal with 
their trade disputes and confrontations for nearly half a century.”10 
 
Although the literature on trade agreements and their implications is 
extensive, there has been a relatively limited scholarly attempt at providing an 
economic rationale for the NT provision. Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis in a 
number of jointly-authored papers offer what is perhaps the best empirical 
analysis of NT, determining that the GATT is an “obligationally incomplete 
contract,” and that the failure of case law to provide a coherent vision for what 
trade practices constitute “protection” is the main obstacle to constructing a 
concise, economic framework for establishing violations of Article III. However, 
                                               
7 Tsai, Eric S. “‘Like’ is a Four-Letter Word-GATT Article III's ‘Like Product’ 
Conundrum.” Berkeley Journal of International Law (1999), Vol. 17 No. 2, 26 - 60. 
8 Grossman, Gene M., Horn, Henrik and Mavroidis, Petros C. “The Legal and Economic 
Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment.” Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics (2012), IFN Working Paper No. 917. 
9 Horn and Mavroidis, 2004. 
10 Lowenfeld, Andreas F. Review of “Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of 
the Modern GATT Legal System” by Robert E. Hudec. American Society of International 
Law (1995), Vol. 89 No. 3, 663 - 666. 
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while Horn and Mavroidis acknowledge the notion of elasticity of substitution as 
a possible determinant of likeness/DCS, they do not present a rigorous analysis 
of this measure’s effectiveness given preexisting case law. 
 
Importantly, Horn notes that reliance on economic indicators as a likeness 
measure, lacking a clear understanding of the legal framework they are being 
applied to, has the weakness of being completely insensitive to a large class of 
regulatory problems—those associated with externalities in the production or 
consumption of the product.11 This issue first arose in the now-infamous United 
States—Taxes on Automobiles, “gas guzzler” case in which the European 
Communities argued that differential taxation based on fuel efficiency was 
inconsistent with Article III and could not be justified under Article XX.12 
 
Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis stress that reliance on legalistic analysis in 
the interpretation Article III.2 needs no motivation—the GATT is an inherently 
legal document. However, relying solely on this perspective is not sufficient given 
that the agreement’s objectives are primarily economic. Economic analysis is thus 
integral to a comprehensive examination of the NT provision.13  
 
The International Trade Law Reports are consulted extensively for their 
detailed analyses of each case related to alcoholic beverages. The authors provide 
expert commentary on each decision of the Dispute Settlement Body that places 
each case in appropriate legal and economic contexts. 
 
3 Case Law on Discriminatory Taxation 
 
                                               
11 To illustrate this point, Horn envisions a situation in which the owner of an auto may 
disregard the fact that his asbestos-containing brakes create health hazards, and would 
consequently view such brakes as identical to asbestos-free alternatives. Using elasticity 
of substitution as a likeness indicator in this case would have the consequence of forcing 
the government to seek an Article XX exception in order to regulate asbestos-containing 
brakes. From Henrik Horn, E-mail to author, 6 October 2015. In these cases it is critical 
to recognize when economic methods of likeness determination must be accompanied by 
legal analysis in order to avoid negative regulatory implications. 
12 The United States considered its taxation scheme to be legal under Article III due to the 
legitimate policy objective of affording lower taxes on autos attaining 22.5 miles per 
gallon or greater, regardless of origin. The Panel found that the measure was consistent 
with Article III.2. See United States—Taxes on Automobiles. World Trade Organization, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis06_e.htm.  
13 Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis, 2012. 
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There are two methods for a complaining party to argue that Article III has 
been violated. For “like” products, the import must be taxed in excess of or 
otherwise treated less favorably than the domestically competing product. For 
products that are DCS, the import must be taxed in excess of a de minimis tax 
differential between the two products, such that the dissimilar taxation operates 
“so as to afford protection” to domestic production.14 The role of the adjudicating 
bodies is to interpret the vague circumstances in which a violation of Article III 
may occur; this includes determining the “likeness” of products and the threshold 
at which differently taxed domestic and foreign products affords protection to the 
former. 
 
Consequently, two approaches for applying the NT provision have arisen—the 
first stresses a flexible definition of likeness to achieve the purpose of the 
provision; the second advocates for an intensely literal reading of the article to 
give each word of the provision its full effect. As a result, the role of the term "like 
product" in the first approach differs completely from that of the second and has 
added an additional layer of complication to decisions of the adjudicating 
bodies.15 
 
Brazilian Internal Taxes is the precedential GATT-era case on tax 
discrimination. A piece of Brazilian tax legislation that antedated Brazil’s entry 
into the GATT applied ratioed duties on French armagnac and other brandy in 
excess of domestically produced spirits. The dispute settlement proceedings were 
initiated by France and supported by the United Kingdom and United States. 
Brazil’s principal argument was that no trade damage had occurred, so the 
differential taxation did not constitute a violation of Article III. Additionally, 
Brazil claimed that in the event trade damage had occurred, the discriminatory 
taxation qualified for an exemption from the terms of Article III under the 
Protocol of Provisional Application.16  
 
                                               
14 Horn and Mavroidis, 2004. 
15 Tsai, 1999. 
16 The agreement among the original GATT Contracting Parties to exempt from GATT 
provisions trade measures established by domestic legislation in force at the time of 
acceptance of the GATT. The protocol was intended to be temporary, pending 
implementation of the Havana Charter or definitive acceptance of GATT provisions by the 
Contracting Parties, but it has remained in effect, and countries that signed it in 1947 
continue to invoke it to defend certain practices that are otherwise inconsistent with their 
GATT obligations. Countries that acceded to the GATT after 1947 have similar provisions 
incorporated in their protocols of accession. See http://goo.gl/Io1ls7  
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The complainants did not support the trade damage argument, and instead 
claimed that the effectiveness of a regulation in affording protection to domestic 
production was irrelevant provided that the intent to do so could be established. 
In this case, the inner-group consensus prevailed; the economic powers that had 
written the GATT commanded the prevailing opinion in its interpretation.17 The 
question of protective intent would arise frequently in future disputes, namely 
Japan—Alcoholic Beverages. 
 
The goal of the complainants in Brazilian Internal Taxes was to use the case 
as precedent for strong adherence to Article III. However over the course of eight 
years, Brazil delayed tangible action despite France threatening retaliation under 
Article XXIII.18 Brazil completed an overhaul of its tariff schedules in 1956 and 
the issue was largely resolved in the absence of a formal Panel decision.19 Because 
the dispute was never adjudicated, the case instead set a precedent for lengthy 
proceedings concerning the intent of the NT obligation that would occur 
continually throughout the GATT- and into the WTO-era. 
 
In Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, the Japanese Liquor Tax Law imposed duties 
on imported spirits such as brandy, cognac, genever, gin, rum, vodka, whiskey 
and others in excess of the domestically produced shochu, a distilled white 
spirit.20 For example, the tax on shochu was between one-fourth and one-seventh 
of the tax on imported brandy and whiskey, clearly affording a significant degree 
of protection to the domestic market.  
 
The complainants—namely the United States, the European Communities 
and Canada—claimed that Japan’s discriminatory Liquor Tax Law operated in 
violation of Article III by taxing imported spirits in excess of the like domestic 
product, shochu. Japan countered with a highly restrictive definition of “like 
product” to both the Panel and AB, claiming that the lack of “identicalness” 
between the product pairs in question implied that Article III.2 could not be 
                                               
17 Hudec, 1990. 
18 The Chairman of the Contracting Parties concluded, “Since the Brazilian Government 
had failed to fulfill its obligations, the provisions of the third sentence of paragraph 2 of 
Article XXIII seemed to have become applicable.” See GATT/CP.4/SR.20, p. 7. The 
sentence referred to is the provision which says that Contracting Parties may authorize 
retaliatory action under Article XXIII in serious cases. 
19 Hudec, Robert E. “The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy.” (Butterworth 
Legal Publishers, 1990). 
20 Bhala, Raj. “Modern GATT Law: A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.” (Sweet & Maxwell Limited: Great Britain, 2005). 
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triggered, and Japan could tax the imports at any rate it desired.21 Raj Bhala’s 
analysis of the case interprets Japan’s defense as follows: 
 
Japan almost certainly had to make this argument. Almost any respondent in an 
Article III case should consider seriously a threshold argument that the National 
Treatment obligation is inapposite, because the imported and domestic products do 
not bear the resemblance necessary to one another to trigger the obligation.22 
 
Japan was well-prepared with a fallback argument invoking Article III.4 in 
case of an adverse Panel determination of likeness. They claimed that if shochu 
was found to be DCS, the Liquor Tax Law still did not violate the NT obligation 
because the differential taxation did not operate “so as to afford protection” 
(SATAP) to domestic production. In other words, Japan argued that Article III 
could not be violated without the intent to afford protection to domestically-
produced DCS products.23 
 
The Panel decision, subsequently upheld by the AB, found that shochu and 
each of the imported spirits were in fact DCS, largely on the grounds of 
similarities in their physical characteristics. Additionally, vodka and shochu were 
found to be like. This determination contributed to the collective understanding 
of like products by qualifying them as a subset of products that are DCS, an 
important distinction that would later be reinforced and expanded upon in 
Korea—Alcoholic Beverages.24 The Appellate Body rendered a meaningless, but 
apt, metaphor in its final report:25 
 
[T]here can be no precise and absolute definition of what is "like." The concept of 
"likeness" is a relative one and evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion of 
"likeness" stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the 
                                               
21 Bhala, 20. 
22 Bhala, 19. 
23 The Japan decision’s discussion of the SATAP criterion dictates that provision of 
protection need only be separately established for products that are found to be DCS. In 
the case of like products, differential taxation is ipso facto understood to operate SATAP. 
24 In fact the Appellate Body noted: "We do not agree with the Panel's observation in 
paragraph 6.22 of the Panel Report that distinguishing between "like products" and 
"directly competitive or substitutable products" under Article III:2 is an "arbitrary 
decision". Rather, we think it is a discretionary decision that must be made in considering 
the various characteristics of products in individual cases." (p.21, WTO, 1996b). See 
Mattoo, Aaditya and Subramanian, Arvind. “Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral 
Disciplines: The Dilemmta and a Possible Resolution.” World Trade Organization and 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper Series (1998), TISD9802.WPF.  
25 Tsai, 1999. 
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WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those places 
must be determined by the particular provision in which the term "like" is 
encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given 
case to which that provision may apply.26 
 
With regard to Japan’s claim that the Liquor Tax Law did not operate SATAP, 
the Panel’s determination was that Article III.1 referred to the actual effect of the 
tax rather than its intent—the so called “aims and effects” test for NT. The intent 
of a regulatory instrument is therefore irrelevant when considering its legality 
under Article III, its effect of affording of protection to the domestic market is the 
sole agent of establishing a violation of the NT obligation. 
 
Japan is an economically significant case because the decision noted that it 
was not “inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution” as a means of 
determining the markets in which products are DCS. 27 This was the first case in 
which the adjudicating body expressed that an economic approach may be 
appropriate for determining product likeness given a sufficiently unclear legal 
framework such as that of NT.28 In the subsequent WTO case, Japan—Alcoholic 
Beverages II, the Panel referenced an ASI study that “contained persuasive 
evidence that there is significant elasticity of substitution among the products in 
dispute.29 
 
Korea—Alcoholic Beverages followed a similar route. Distilled beverages 
including whiskey, vodka and gin imported from the United States and European 
Communities were taxed pursuant to the Korean Liquor Tax Law in excess of the 
                                               
26 Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, International Trade Law Reports (1996), Vol. I 
Issue 2. 
27 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, and WT/DS11/AB/R, §H.1(a) (adopted 1 November 1996). 
28 Japan demonstrates that the legal interpretation of likeness in terms of physical 
similarity creates significant regulatory issues. To see this, consider two pairs of products: 
one is vodka and shochu, which were held to be like products in Japan, and the other is 
two chemicals that are much more similar than vodka and shochu in their physical 
constitution, but such that one is harmless and the other is extremely dangerous. No one 
would suggest that these chemicals are like products; it is therefore clear that the issue of 
likeness is distinct from the issue of physical similarity. See Howse, Robert and Regan, 
Donald. “The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy.” European Journal of International Law (2000), Vol. 11 
No. 2, 249 - 289. 
29 Panel Report on Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, supra, para. 6.29. From Dispute 
Settlement Reports, World Trade Organization (1999), Vol. I. 
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domestically produced soju.30 The European Communities and United States 
stressed the similarities of the Korean taxation scheme to that of Japan, which 
was found to be inconsistent with Article III in Japan and Japan—Alcoholic 
Beverages II. Korea argued that there was no like or DCS relationship between 
soju and the imported products, so the discriminatory taxation was legal under 
Article III. Addressing Article III directly, Korea argued for a narrow 
interpretation of the provision in order to protect the sovereignty of Members 
over the structure of their respective tax systems.31  
 
The Korean Liquor Tax Law established 10 categories of distilled spirits and 
assessed tariffs at ad valorem rates depending on the category of product, 
according to the table below: 
 
Category of Alcoholic Beverage Ad Valorem Tax Rate (Percent) 
Diluted soju 35 
Distilled soju 50 
Liqueur 50 
Other liquors (brandy, whisky, gin, rum, 
tequila, vodka and mixed distilled drinks) 
80-100 
 
The taxation scheme reveals that soju is taxed at 35-50 percent and imported 
distilled beverages at 80-100 percent, making market access for imports 
effectively impossible. 
 
In formulating its decision, the Panel examined physical characteristics, end 
uses, price relationships and advertising. Korea is the first case in which 
consumer perceptions of a product, as influenced by advertising, were considered 
to be determinants of a competitive relationship; this is significant when taking a 
quantitative approach to likeness determination, as advertising is likely to 
influence the degree to which consumers regard products as substitutable. The 
Panel decision found soju and the imported spirits in question to be DCS, and 
that the tax differential between the two exceeded the de minimis threshold, 
establishing the SATAP criterion required for an Article III violation. There was 
insufficient evidence, however to validate the argument of the complainants that 
                                               
30 Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, International Trade Law Reports (1999), Vol. 
IV Issue 4. 
31 ITLR, 1999. 
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soju and vodka were like products. Notably, the findings on this claim were not 
appealed to the Appellate Body. 
 
In the Korea decision, the Panel recognized the merits of a quantitative 
determination of product likeness, but was justifiably hesitant to rely unduly on 
it. Special weight was placed upon the modifier “directly,” as an indication that 
the principal determinant of a DCS relationship is the extent to which there exists 
a competitive relationship between products, as perceived by consumers.32 With 
respect to substitutability, the Panel noted that a high degree of substitution as 
demonstrated by cross price elasticity or elasticity of substitution, is indicative of 
a potential DCS relationship, however the Panel did not directly consider any 
economic evidence. In their economic analysis of the case, Aubrey Silberston and 
Mahmud Nawaz conclude that: 
 
Using economists techniques for assessing the closeness of products in demand and 
supply - bread and butter work of any national competition authority case which 
employ economists and expert witnesses all the time - WTO disputes can begin to 
achieve more rigour and consistency in decision making, in what are always highly 
political and sensitive cases.33 
 
In Chile—Alcoholic Beverages, the complainants alleged that the Chilean 
Additional Tax on Alcoholic Beverages law applied discriminatory taxes to 
imported distilled beverages in favor of domestically produced pisco. In 
particular, the law categorized all spirits into three ad valorem tariff columns: 
whisky, pisco and all others, where pisco was taxed at the lowest rate.34  
 
Chile argued that its taxation scheme was legal under Article III because the 
imported spirits and pisco were not like or DCS, mainly due to slight differences 
in their alcoholic content. The European Communities claimed that:35 
 
The [Additional Tax on Alcoholic Beverages]...is contrary to GATT Article III:2, 
second sentence, because it provides for the imposition of lower internal taxes on 
                                               
32 ITLR, 1999. 
33 ITLR, 1999. 
34 Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, International Trade Law Reports (2000), Vol. V 
Issue 1. 
35 The European Communities noted that in its panel request, it also claimed a violation 
of GATT Article III:2, first sentence, which stated that even though certain spirits 
exported from the EC to Chile may be considered as being “like” to pisco, it decided not to 
pursue that claim, given that those spirits were in any event DCS with pisco, due to Japan 
establishing that like products are a subset of DCS products. 
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pisco than on other directly competitive or substitutable imported spirits which fall 
within the tax categories of “whisky” and “other spirits”, so as to afford protection to 
Chile’s domestic production36 
 
Taking the same interpretive route as in Korea, the Panel disagreed with 
Chile’s defense, and found the product pairs in question to be DCS. The Panel 
report concluded that “substitutability and competitiveness refer to the ability of 
products that may be dissimilar in some respects to satisfy a particular consumer 
want.”37 To determine this ability, the Panel focused on common end-uses by 
examining a number of factors, inter alia, the existence of a positive elasticity of 
substitution between them.38 Additionally, the Panel noted that “a high degree of 
cross-price elasticity is a clear indicator of direct competitiveness or 
substitutability.”39 Chile did not seek to rebut this conclusion in its appeal, and 
instead focused on defining the de minimis tax differential that was determined 
to have afforded protection to domestic production. 
 
The inclusion of economic theory in decisions of the adjudicating bodies 
changed fundamentally with European Communities—Asbestos, which 
represents one of the highest profile disputes handled by the WTO panel and 
Appellate Body.40 In 1996, the French Government banned the manufacturing, 
sale, possession and import of all forms of asbestos and products containing 
asbestos fibers, citing its toxicity and carcinogenicity as a significant health risk. 
Canada claimed that the French ban was illegal because a specific type of 
asbestos, chrysotile, was safe under properly controlled use and was therefore 
being afforded less favorable treatment than like domestic products. 
 
The criteria for likeness considered by the Panel included physical 
characteristics, consumers’ tastes and habits, the product’s end-uses in a given 
                                               
36 Following the precedent set by Japan with respect to correctly establishing a violation 
of Article III, the complaint of the European Communities independently suggests that i) 
the dissimilar taxation between pisco and imported distilled spirits exceeds the de 
minimis threshold set by the interpretive note attached to Article III.2 and ii) the 
dissimilar taxation operates so as to afford protection to domestic production. See Panel 
Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/R and WT/DS110/R, (15 June 
1999). 
37 Panel Report, para. 7.80. 
38 A positive elasticity of substitution suggests that products are substitutable; an 
elasticity of substitution equal to one suggests perfect substitutability, indicative of 
product likeness. 
39 ITLR, 2000. 
40 European Communities—Asbestos, International Trade Law Reports (2003), Vol. VI 
Issue 4. 
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market and tariff classification. The presence of asbestos in a product is largely 
inconsequential in these regards, despite the obvious health risks that it poses. 
Thus, the Panel found that health is not a determinant of product likeness 
pursuant to Article III.4, essentially declaring chrysotile asbestos and its 
asbestos-free substitutes, including polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass fibers, 
like products.  
 
The case was appealed to the AB, which reversed the Panel decision and 
noted that “fundamental human interests such as health” should be considered in 
decisions of product likeness.41 The AB upheld its favorable view of the economic 
approach in making this decision; when evaluating the competitive relationship 
between products in the relevant marketplace, all evidence should be taken into 
account. 
 
4 Economic Analysis of Product Likeness 
 
Cross-price elasticity shows the percentage increase in demand for good i as a 
result of a percentage increase in the price of good j. The mathematical definition 
of cross-price elasticity is given as: 
 
 
If goods i and j are substitutes, the cross-price elasticity will be positive, as an 
increase in the price of good i will cause consumers to increase their demand for 
good j. A positive cross-price elasticity indicates that goods are substitutes, 
whereas a negative cross-price elasticity indicates that goods are complements. 
 
Korea established a parallel between the economic notion of substitutability 
and the legal concept of likeness under Article III. Products that are perfect 
substitutes may be considered like; imperfect substitutes may be considered DCS. 
It is important to note that there are not clear distinctions drawn between either 
of these categories, and analysis on a case-by-case basis remains necessary. As 
Frieder Roessler observes, “A fox and an eagle are like animals for a hare but not 
for a furrier.”42  
                                               
41 ITLR, 2003. 
42 Roessler, Frieder. “Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: 
Lessons from the Past Symposium on Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2014), Vol. 19 No. 
2, 513. 
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 To establish product likeness from an economic perspective, the cross-price 
elasticity of demand must be calculated using time series data that includes 
prices of each product before and after the application of the alleged 
discriminatory taxation. Taking an economic view of the Korea determination, 
Mattoo and Subramanian conclude: 
 
it would be necessary to establish that the difference in taxation is sufficient to induce 
substitution between products given the level of consumer responsiveness, measured, 
for instance, by the cross-price elasticity of demand. This may mean little more than 
establishing that differences are greater than a de minimis level, but this level would 
be defined on the basis of an economically meaningful and justifiable criterion rather 
than an arbitrary interpretation of dissimilarity.43  
 
To create such an economically meaningful and justifiable criterion, consider 
the market for distilled spirits in Japan. A complete pivot in demand from vodka 
to shochu following a price increase of imported vodka would indicate that the 
two are perfect substitutes, and therefore like products under Article III. In the 
case of a spirit such as cognac, consumer demand would shift only partially to 
preferring shochu following the application of differential taxation, indicating 
that the products are imperfect substitutes. Provided that the differential taxation 
meets the de minimis threshold and operates SATAP, the products may be 
considered DCS. 
 
Consumption of Vodka and Shochu in Japan, 2006-201044 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Import volume of vodka, kL 3060 3036 2768 2954 2805 
Price of vodka, $m 16.738 19.263 19.342 20.985 21.342 
Price of vodka, $/L 5.47 6.34 6.99 7.10 7.61 
Volume of Shochu, kL 1000 1005 973 961 1096 
 
                                               
43 Mattoo and Subramanian, 1997. 
44 This model will assume that all vodka consumed in Japan has been imported, that all 
shochu has been domestically produced and that there is no markup between the import 
price of vodka and the price consumers pay. 
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From the above formula, we calculate the cross-price elasticity for the most 
recent change in price, 2009-2010 to be: 
 
 
 
Because consumption of shochu increased following the rise in the price of 
vodka, the cross-price elasticity between the spirits is positive, indicating that 
they are substitutes. Japanese consumers still exhibited demand for vodka, so it 
is unlikely that vodka and shochu are perfect substitutes. Quantitative methods 
are useful in determining whether products are imperfectly substitutable and 
therefore DCS, however the like product determination requires a subsequent 
legal interpretation of the data.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
EC-Asbestos radically changed the economic interpretation of the NT 
obligation by exposing regulatory externalities that arise when traditional 
determinants of product likeness are evaluated in a vacuum. When considering 
product characteristics such as cross price elasticity and elasticity of substitution 
post-Asbestos, implications affecting, inter alia, health of consumers that are not 
reflected in the quantitative analysis must be properly acknowledged. 
 
It is important to note that virtually no two goods are “like” in terms of being 
perfectly substitutable. As Horn states and case law confirms, context-
independent reliance on the elasticity of substitution as the sole measure of 
product likeness introduces a large class of regulatory externalities; the goal of 
Article III is therefore not to reduce itself to identifying purely identical products. 
There exists a spectrum of substitutability for which it is appropriate to use 
economic methods built upon the current legal understanding of NT to place 
products upon.  
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